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It is trivial that not all agreement is rational. As we all know, or at least suspect, for 
almost every instance of an actual agreement among participants in discourse that is 
normatively binding beyond the constraints of positive law or socialized ethics there is 
always at least one example of a pathological compact that claims to be consensual when 
in fact it is not. But is there such a thing as rational dissensus? Can we speak of a 
principled disagreement between reasonable and self-transparent individuals who freely 
exchange validity claims against the practical-theoretical background formed by mutually 
verifiable epistemic facts and universalizable practical norms? Based on a comparative 
analysis of Habermas and Brandom, Zarebski sides with the latter in order to argue that 
the notion of rational dissensus is not a contradiction in terms. I disagree. Against 
Zarebski, and based on a different reading of the Habermas-Brandom exchange, I argue 
that Habermas is right and Brandom wrong, at least as far as the question of rational 
dissensus is concerned. 
 There seem to be two reasons for this. First, on Brandom’s theory dissensus, just 
like consensus, may be norm-based, but not necessarily rational, or at least not in the way 
in which the notion of practical (or moral) rationality is conceived of since Kant. (It 
would be useful to add here that Brandom also claims to subscribe to Kant’s conception 
of practical reason as autonomy, or self-legislation.) This is particularly important in the 
present context of discussion. For, as Habermas puts it, “Norms have to be established 
‘rationally’ in accord with norms of reason, and this process therefore cannot itself 
provide the model for an explanation of normativity.” (Habermas 2003, p. 140) 
Moreover, since according to Habermas Brandom assimilates norms of rationality in the 
broadest sense to norms of action, he fails to take into account the fact that “being 
affected by reasons is…a different matter than being obliged by norms.” The latter “bind 
the will of agents,” whereas the former “direct their minds.” (Ibid.)  
 What Brandom can account for is the institution of social normativity through 
linguistic communication. Now, to the extent that normativity in this sense also happens 
to be externally compatible with practical rationality as self-legislation, the notion of 
rational consensus does not reveal any significant differences between Habermas and 
Brandom, as Zarebski correctly indicates in his paper. However, the notion of rational 
dissensus is more problematic for Habermas because unlike Brandom he cannot reduce 
the validity base of moral norms to what is epistemically justified and thus to social 
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normativity. There may well be room for dissensus in Habermas’s theory, but dissensus 
for him cannot be rational in the required practical sense. 
 In his defense, Brandom claims that his social account of conceptual normativity, 
which Habermas does not challenge, makes it impossible for him to carve out a 
privileged position for the kind of moral rationality that Habermas identifies as 
foundational with respect to all practical norms. (Brandom 2000, p. 365) This is a fair 
observation. However, Brandom also points out that his explanation of social normativity 
does not exclude the emergence of moral normativity (or rationality) out of pre-existing 
normative contexts. (Brandom 2000, p. 366) As he puts it, the “road to ethics is paved by 
logic.” (Brandom 2000, pp. 372) This may well be so. Nevertheless, it remains unclear 
just how this transition from logic to ethics is supposed to obtain without the guidance of 
some preliminary notion of practical rationality that is not reducible to the competent use 
of concepts. Which brings us back to Habermas’ initial objection. 
 There is also a second reason why ‘rational dissensus’ seems to be such a 
misnomer. In Habermas’s interpretation, Brandom’s notion of consensus is nothing more 
than a descriptive label. It is what an external observer (the “scorekeeper”) uses to 
confirm that the participants in communication appear to have reached an understanding 
of each other’s position in the space of reasons. But this is not the same as determining 
that the speakers truly achieved consensus. Correct concept use adds no value to will 
formation. Brandom can meaningfully speak of rational dissensus only because its 
contradictory, or rational consensus is not fully captured by his theory to begin with. And 
if there is no real consensus, there can be no true dissensus, either. 
 Why is this so? Habermas claims that Brandom’s understanding of linguistic 
communication (Verständigung) is based on a flawed model of information transmission 
from sender to addressee. In his words, “Brandom construes what he calls the ‘I-thou 
relation’ as the relation between a first person who raises validity claims and a third 
person who attributes validity claims to the first.” (Habermas 2003, p. 162) The 
scorekeeper is the spectator who assesses the utterances exchanged by the two speakers, 
but not the “addressee who is expected to reply to the speaker.” (Ibid.) This would 
directly account for the difference between what Habermas calls Brandom’s “one-sided 
understanding of another” and Habermas’ own position, or the “mutual understanding of 
each other.” Whereas the former explains the kind of meaning understanding that is 
typical of action coordination (unsurprisingly, Brandom’s examples of consensual 
activities refer to deeply strategic games like baseball, or to the kind of tacit adjustment to 
a partner’s reactions as in ballroom dancing), the latter brings into the equation the 
dimension of intersubjective recognition that is characteristic of interpersonal cooperation 
and social integration. (Habermas 2003, p. 165) Action coordination, however, is not the 
same as unity of will (or consensus).  
 Now, Brandom is probably right that achieving consensus in Habermas’ sense 
cannot be the whole point of linguistic practice. (Brandom 2000, p. 363) But achieving 
practical consensus cannot be reduced to the epistemic justification of assertions, either. I 
wonder if Zarebski’s defense of rational dissensus along Brandomian lines can truly 
account for this difference.  
 To conclude, the notion of rational dissensus is available to Brandom but not to 
Habermas only because ‘rational’ for Brandom means much less than it does for 
Habermas. As well, the meaning of ‘consensus’ in Brandom is restricted to the correct 
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use of rules of inference, which says nothing about the motivational component of 
interpersonal communication. If anything, the possibility of rational dissensus as 
Brandom conceives it provides additional confirmation of Habermas’ claim that 
competent communication is the necessary, yet not sufficient condition of practical 
rationality. 
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